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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy Cook contends the district court erred by analyzing his motion for reconsideration
of the order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief under the wrong
standard.  The district court evaluated that motion under I.R.C.P. 59(e) (hereinafter, Rule 59(e))
instead of, as the merits of the motion reveal was appropriate, I.R.C.P. 60(b) (hereinafter, Rule
60(b)).
The  State  makes  several  responses,  none  of  which  are  persuasive.   Under  the  proper
standards, the State’s arguments are either irrelevant to the issues on appeal or are meritless
given the facts of this case.  Rather, the proper analysis reveals the district court used the wrong
standard to assess Mr. Cook’s motion for reconsideration, and this case should be remanded for
further proceedings as a result of that error.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Cook’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
2ISSUE
Whether the district court analyzed Mr. Cook’s Motion for Reconsideration under the wrong
standard, and so, erroneously denied that motion.
3ARGUMENT
The District Court Analyzed Mr. Cook’s Motion For Reconsideration Under The Wrong
Standard, And So, Erroneously Denied That Motion
The State’s arguments in this case fail to recognize or give effect to the proper standards
of review on appeal.  As a result, its arguments are either irrelevant given, or meritless under, the
proper analysis.
For example, the State contends the district court did not err by using Rule 59(e) to
evaluate Mr. Cook’s motion for reconsideration.  (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12 (arguing that the
second factor identified in Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 706 (Ct. App. 2015), indicates Rule
59(e) was the appropriate standard).)  According to the State, because Mr. Nelson (the post-
conviction attorney whose performance is at issue) told the district court he did not intend to file
additional affidavits in support of the post-conviction petition, Mr. Cook did not present “new”
information by bringing his motion for reconsideration based on Mr. Nelson’s failure to respond
to the pending summary dismissal.  (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)  That argument is belied by Bias
itself.
In Bias, the Court of Appeals held that a motion for reconsideration which, just like
Mr. Cook’s motion, “contained new information via allegations of ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel” was properly considered under Rule 60(b), and thus, the district court erred
by using Rule 59(e) to evaluate that motion. Bias, 159 Idaho at 706.  The reason for that result is
that a claim about the sufficiently of counsel’s representation is a distinctly different issue from
the underlying claim counsel should have made. See, e.g., State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913
(Ct. App. 2011); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 295-96 (Ct. App. 2004).  As such, just because
the district court was aware that Mr. Nelson was not going to file a response to the pending
4summary dismissal, that does not mean the district court was, ipso facto, also aware of the claim
that Mr. Nelson had not provided any meaningful representation.
The record also belies the State’s argument in this regard, as it reveals that, at no point
prior  to  the  motion  for  reconsideration  did  Mr.  Cook  make  any  allegations  or  present  facts  to
demonstrate that Mr. Nelson had failed to provide any meaningful representation.  (See generally
R.)   In  fact,  it  was  not  until  he  filed  that  motion  that  the  copies  of  the  affidavits  which
Mr. Nelson could have, but failed to, obtain and file in support of the petition were presented to
the district court.  (See Aug., pp.4-5, 8-17.)  Therefore, under the applicable legal standards,
Mr. Cook’s claim that Mr. Nelson failed to provide meaningful representation because
Mr. Nelson failed to respond to the pending summary dismissal presented a new issue based on
new  information  (the  new  affidavits).   As  such,  both  of  the Bias factors indicate Mr. Cook’s
motion for reconsideration was not a Rule 59(e) motion, but rather,  was a Rule 60(b) motion.1
See Bias, 159 Idaho at 706.  Thus, the State’s argument to the contrary – that the district court
properly evaluated Mr. Cook’s motion under Rule 59(e) – is wholly inconsistent with both the
facts of this case and the relevant law, and so, should be rejected.
Likewise,  the  State’s  arguments  as  to  the  proper  remedy  for  that  error  do  not  comport
with the proper standards.  Specifically, the State’s arguments fail to account for the Idaho
Supreme Court’s decision in Eby v. State, in which the Supreme Court explained that, when the
district court considers a motion for reconsideration under the wrong standard, that should be the
end of the inquiry; such a case needs to be remanded so the district court can make the necessary
factual findings under the proper standard. Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737 (2010).  The State
offers no argument on this point.  (See generally Resp. Br.)
1 The State conceded that the first Bias factor – the time of the filing – indicated the motion was
not a Rule 59(e) motion.  (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.)
5Rather, the State relies only on the Court of Appeals’ subsequent decision in Bias for its
remedy analysis, thus simply asserting this Court should assess whether Mr. Cook’s claims
actually have merit under Rule 60(b) before remanding it.  (See Resp. Br., p.14.)  However, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that “when there is a conflict between our decisions on an issue
of law and those of the Court of Appeals,” “we simply expect lower courts, including the Court
of Appeals, to follow decisions of this Court.” State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013).
That means Eby, not Bias,  controls the remedy analysis in this case,  and the State’s arguments
which, though based on Bias,  are  contrary  to Eby should be rejected.  Under Eby, this case
should be remanded because the district court considered the motion for reconsideration under
the wrong standard.
Even if this Court concludes Bias’s approach to the remedy analysis is correct, the State’s
arguments  about  the  merits  of  Mr.  Cook’s  claims  under  Rule  60(b)  still  fail  to  recognize  and
apply the proper standards.  For example, the first basis on which Mr. Cook’s allegations were
viable under Rule 60(b) is his allegation that Mr. Nelson did not provide any meaningful
representation of Mr. Cook. See Eby, 148 Idaho at 737 (holding that where there is “a complete
absence of meaningful representation” by post-conviction counsel, that is a viable claim for relief
under Rule 60(b)(6)).  The State contends that, because Mr. Nelson had some communication
with Mr. Cook, Mr. Nelson stated he performed research on the issues in this case, and
Mr. Nelson filed generic procedural motions, there was not “a complete absence of meaningful
representation.”   (Resp.  Br.,  p.16  (emphasis  from  original).)   However,  that  argument  was
effectively rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Eby.
Just  as  Mr.  Nelson  did,  the  attorney  in Eby submitted “filings with the district court
[which] were four responses to the notices of proposed dismissal and requests for retention.
6These responses did indicate that [the attorney] had conducted a ‘review, investigation, research
and analysis of post-conviction issues.’” Eby, 148 Idaho at 733.  Following the logic of the
State’s argument, those facts would be enough to foreclose relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  (See
Resp. Br., pp.12, 15-16.)  And yet, the Eby Court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that,
even with those facts, the record still showed “the complete absence of meaningful
representation.” Id. at 737.
Thus, the State’s focus on whether there was “a complete absence” of any attorney-like
activities was effectively rejected by the Eby Court.  Rather, the Eby Court’s analysis reveals the
proper focus is on whether there was any “meaningful representation.” Eby, 148 Idaho at 737
(emphasis added).  There was nothing meaningful in the Eby attorney’s filing of generic motions
for continuation or his assertion that he had reviewed and researched the allegations in the
petition  because  that  attorney  still  failed  to  file  any  sort  of  response  to  the  pending  notice  of
summary dismissal. See id.  As a result, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was appropriate. Id.
Similarly, there was nothing meaningful about Mr. Nelson’s filing of the generic motion
for continuance, his communication with Mr. Cook, or his assertion that he had researched the
potential issues in this case because Mr. Nelson still failed to make any response to the pending
notice of, and motion for, summary dismissal.  That is particularly evident in this case since
Mr. Cook also presented evidence which demonstrated there was a response Mr. Nelson could
have made in that regard – he could have, as Mr. Cook’s subsequent attorney did, obtained and
filed copies of appropriate affidavits supporting the claims in the petition.  When there is no
explanation for why counsel did not pursue potentially-exculpatory and easily-obtainable
information, the petitioner “raises a serious question regarding the vigor and competence of [the]
representation of [the petitioner].” See Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649, 654 (1997).  Based on
7that, Mr. Cook, just like the petitioner in Eby, alleged a viable claim for relief under Rule
60(b)(6).  As such, the State’s arguments, which are contrary to that clear Idaho Supreme Court
precedent directly on point, should be rejected, and this case should be remanded even under the
Bias framework.
The same conclusion exists in regard to the second basis on which Mr. Cook’s motion
was viable under Rule 60(6):  that the judgment should be set aside because, due to Mr. Cook’s
excusable neglect (his reliance on Mr. Nelson), Mr. Cook did not file an otherwise-viable motion
to reconsider the judgment under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(b) (hereinafter, Rule 11(a)(2)(b)) within
fourteen days of the judgment.2  The State’s first contention – that this issue was not raised to the
district  court  – is  belied by the record.   (See Resp. Br., p.17.)  Through the Rule 60(b) motion
and Mr. Cook’s affidavit in support thereof, Mr. Cook expressly requested relief on the basis that
he had requested Mr. Nelson file a viable a motion to reconsider the judgment within the
statutorily-authorized period, but Mr. Nelson failed to do so.  (R., pp.195, 198.)  Thus, that issue
was before the district court.  The fact that the district court did not evaluate Mr. Cook’s
allegations for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) does not
change that conclusion.  (See Resp. Br., p.17 (arguing the district court did not have the
opportunity to rule on this issue).)  Rather, it is only further evidence of the district court’s error
in deciding to analyze the whole motion under Rule 59(e) instead of Rule 60(b).
The State’s second contention, which goes to the merits of the Rule 60(b)(1) analysis, is
similarly flawed.  First, the State improperly focuses on Mr. Nelson as the source of the neglect.
2 Rule  11(a)(2)  has  since  been  renumbered  as  I.R.C.P.  11.2(b)  (hereinafter, Rule 11.2(b)).
Additionally, as noted in the Appellant’s Brief, due to the timing of the final judgment, the
requested motion to reconsider the judgment may have needed to be brought under Rule 59(e)
instead of Rule 11(a)(2)(b).  (See App. Br., p.17 n.9.)  However, that concern does not change
the conclusion that Mr. Nelson’s failure to file the requested motion helps establish the basis for
a viable claim under Rule 60(b)(1).
8(See, e.g., Resp.  Br.,  p.17  (“[Mr.]  Cook  has  also  failed  to  show  that  refusal  to  file  a
reconsideration motion here would have been neglect, as opposed to a reasonable strategic
decision.”).)  The excusable neglect to which Rule 60(b)(1) is referring is Mr. Cook’s neglect in
not filing the motion to reconsider the judgment within the allowed time.3 See Rule 60(b)(1).
The point of this rule is that, while a party is usually bound by his attorney’s actions, when the
failure to make an otherwise-viable action is due to the attorney’s unreasonable performance, the
consequences  of  the  attorney’s  unreasonable  failure  will  not  be  enforced  against  the  attorney’s
client. See, e.g., Jonsson v. Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 638-39 (2005) (holding that the party’s
failure to answer the complaint, which led to a default judgment, was due to excusable neglect
under Rule 60(b)(1) because the party had reasonably relied on an agent to find him an attorney
to respond to that complaint, but the agent failed to do so); compare Southern Idaho Production
Credit Ass’n v. Gneiting, 109 Idaho 493, 494 (1985) (explaining that a party’s failure to respond
to a motion for default judgment constituted excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) because the
fault for failing to respond lay with counsel, not the party, and the Supreme Court would not
“visit the sins of the attorney upon the head of his clients”).4
The reasoning behind that point is that is that the courts should opt to resolve such
matters on their merits. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709 (2005) (“Because judgments by default
3 Even if the proper analysis focused on Mr. Nelson’s decision to not file the requested motion,
there is no strategic reason for an attorney to not file a viable motion to reconsider the judgment
since such a motion is the means by which a party can ensure the district court’s decision was
based on the proper law and facts. See Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 913 (2014).
As discussed infra,  the district  court’s decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Cook’s petition does
not appear to have taken all the relevant facts and law into account.  Therefore, there was no
strategic basis for Mr. Nelson to have not filed the requested motion to ensure the district court
took all the relevant facts and law into account.
4 As in the Appellant’s Brief, due to the language in the Gneiting Opinion, that case is only
provided as an example of how a learned court has analyzed the facts and law in the Rule
60(b)(1) context, not as controlling precedent dictating a result in Mr. Cook’s case.  (See App.
Br., p.16 n.8.)
9are not favored, a trial court should grant relief [under Rule 60(b)] in doubtful cases in order to
decide the case on the merits.”); cf. Eby, 148 Idaho at 737 (acknowledging that particular need to
resolve these sort of claims on their merits since post-conviction is the “only available
proceeding for [the petitioner] to advance [certain] constitutional challenges to his conviction
and sentence”).  Therefore, the State’s arguments as to why Mr. Nelson may have decided not to
file the requested motion are ultimately irrelevant to the proper analysis under Rule 60(b)(1).
Rather, the proper analysis looks at whether Mr. Cook was acting as a reasonably prudent person
would in the same circumstances, and thus, his failure to file that otherwise-viable motion within
the  time  allowed  due  to  his  reliance  on  his  attorney,  who  failed  to  file  that  requested  motion,
constituted excusable neglect.
To the underlying premise in that regard, the State contends the requested motion to
reconsider the judgment would not have been viable because the State questioned the credibility
of the allegations upon which the requested motion would have been based (the affidavits filed
with Mr. Cook’s pro se motion for conflict counsel).  Specifically, the State focuses on whether
those allegations would have actually shown trial counsel, Mr. Nona, was ineffective for not
investigating the potential alibi defense based on a concern that the allegations in those affidavits
would  not  actually  establish  an  alibi  defense.   (See Resp. Br., pp.17-18.)  In making that
argument, the State again fails to appreciate the proper analysis.
Rule 60(b)(1) only requires the moving party to “plead facts which, if established, would
constitute a defense to the action.” Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 289 (2009) (internal
quotation omitted).  Since “the action” which the requested motion was to have addressed is the
order for summary dismissal, the proper analysis looks at whether the alleged facts would
constitute a defense to summary dismissal. See id.  To establish a defense to summary dismissal,
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the petitioner need only show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, meaning he shows
that, with all the facts considered in the light most favorable to the him, he would be entitled to
relief. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008).  As such, the State’s argument about the
credibility of the allegations in the affidavits is irrelevant because that argument fails to consider
the facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner; viewed in the light most favorable to
Mr. Cook, those allegations are considered to be both credible and accurate. See, e.g., Mata v.
State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that, when the evidence is construed liberally
in the petitioner’s favor “as required on a review of a summary dismissal,” the allegations of the
petitioner alone may establish a sufficient basis to survive summary dismissal).
The  alleged  facts  would,  if  true,  entitle  Mr.  Cook to  post-conviction  relief.   One  of  the
bases for the order of summary dismissal was that Mr. Cook had not identified the witness or the
testimony trial counsel should have investigated.  (R., pp.122-23.)  However, the affidavits
Mr. Cook attached to his pro se motion for conflict counsel, which the district court evidently did
not consider in its summary dismissal analysis, not only identified a relevant witness who may
have had knowledge relevant to a potential alibi defense, but alleged that trial counsel was aware
of that potential witnesses and did not interview him.  (See R., pp.134-35, 144 (alleging (1) per
Robert Cook, there was a potential alibi defense – that Mr. Cook was at Mr. Ames’ house
working on his motorcycle at the time, and (2) per Mr. Ames, that trial counsel was supposed to
have interviewed Mr. Ames as a potential witness, but trial counsel did not do so).)  Therefore,
that information, if considered, would have eliminated the potential basis for summary dismissal.
As a result, the requested motion to reconsider the judgment would have allowed Mr. Cook to
ensure the summary dismissal decision was made on a proper understanding of the facts and
relevant law, and under that proper understanding, there was a genuine issue of material fact.
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That means the facts Mr. Cook pled in his Rule 60(b) motion, if established, would show
a defense to the order for summary dismissal, and so, his Rule 60(b) motion was viable under
Rule 60(b)(1).  Put another way, this shows the disadvantage caused by Mr. Nelson’s failure to
file the requested motion (see Resp. Br., p.19 (claiming that failure to act caused no disadvantage
to Mr. Cook)) – Mr. Cook’s petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed based on an
apparent misunderstanding of what the facts in the record actually showed, and Mr. Nelson’s
failure to file the requested motion deprived Mr. Cook of his opportunity to bring that issue to
the district court’s attention. See Agrisource, 156 Idaho at 913 (discussing the reason such
motions to reconsider the judgment are allowed under Rule 11(a)(2)(b), as well as the difference
between such motions and motions brought under Rule 60(b)).
Finally, the State contends that “it is farfetched that [the allegations in the affidavits
which would have underlaid the requested motion] would have affected the notice of dismissal.”
(Resp. Br., p.18.)  However, that argument also fails to appreciate the entirety of the proper
analysis in this regard.  The analysis in this context is looking for the possibility that there was a
defense to the summary dismissal order which the district court did not get to, but should have
been able to, consider; the question is not whether the defendant has proved that summary
dismissal was ultimately erroneous. See Meyers, 148 Idaho at 289 (requiring only that the
moving “plead facts which, if established, would constitute a defense to the action” to show his
motion  would  be  viable  under  Rule  60(b))  (emphasis  added).   It  is  for  this  reason  that,  even
though, in the Supreme Court’s opinion, the moving party’s case for relief under Rule 60(b) was
“doubtful in the extreme,” the Gneiting Court still granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Gneiting,
109 Idaho at 495; accord Suitts, 141 Idaho at 709 (“Because judgments by default are not
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favored, a trial court should grant relief in doubtful cases in order to decide the case on the
merits.”).
Thus, under the proper standards and analysis, the district court erred in evaluating
Mr. Cook’s motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) instead of Rule 60(b), and this Court
should remand this case in light of that error, even under the Bias framework.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Cook respectfully requests this Court vacate the order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2017.
_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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